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ABSTRACT 
The Asian financial crisis increased economic disparities in the East Asian region, thus 
making monetary integration more difficult, but rekindled political interest in Asian 
monetary and exchange rate cooperation. This paper applies the theory of Generalized 
Purchasing Power Parity (G-PPP), which looks at the behavior of long-run real exchange 
rates, to assess the potential for an optimum currency area (OCA) among a subset of East 
Asian countries based on five of the more advanced members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN5). Our findings suggest little support for an OCA for 
ASEAN5 as a bloc prior to the Asian financial crisis and mixed results in the post-crisis 
period. In particular, asymmetries in the way countries adjust to shocks and low or 
insignificant speeds of adjustment were found. Thus, although the application of single 
OCA criteria is notoriously demanding and our tests apply to only one of the many 
criteria for the successful formation of an OCA, we cannot find persuasive evidence that 
ASEAN5 as a group constitute a potential currency area with either the USA or Japan, 
even when the ‘noisy’ period of the Asian financial crisis is omitted.   1
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The Asian financial crisis of 1997 increased economic disparities in the East Asian (EA) 
region, thus making monetary integration more difficult, but rekindled political interest in 
Asian monetary and exchange rate cooperation. The crisis highlighted the difficulties of 
managing exchange rates unilaterally for an open economy faced with substantial 
international capital inflows and increased the attraction of a common exchange rate 
arrangement and a common currency in the longer term.  
Although a fully-fledged currency union or common exchange rate mechanism is not on 
the immediate horizon, it is likely that EA countries will continue to pursue more limited 
goals in monetary cooperation. In which case it is pertinent to ask how far EA or a subset 
of EA countries, such as the five most advanced members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN5)
2, satisfy the economic criteria for a monetary union. This is 
important not simply because it will affect the political agenda for countries 
contemplating further monetary integration, but because some minimum prerequisites in 
terms of economic integration are necessary for the development of common monetary 
institutions. Advocates of a common EA exchange rate policy, such as Williamson 
(1998) and McKinnon (2000), do assume that EA countries are sufficiently close as 
trading partners and competitors in world markets to justify a common monetary 
arrangement. If this is not so, the case for giving up unilateral exchange rate regimes is 
significantly weaker. 
The objective of this paper is to complement the existing empirical literature on the 
feasibility of monetary integration in EA. To date, this literature has relied largely on a 
mixture of ad hoc proxies to see if groups of countries satisfy standard optimum currency 
                                                 
1 A first draft of this paper was presented at the Western Economic Association International Pacific Rim 
Conference, Taipei in January 2003. We would also like to thank the Staff of the Regional Economic 
Monitoring Unit (REMU) at the Asian Development Bank in Manila for their helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. 
2 ASEAN5 consists of  Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.    2
area (OCA) criteria
3, or the use of a structural vector autoregression methodology to 
establish whether potential members of a currency union experience symmetric or 
asymmetric demand and supply shocks, which is a critical factor in deciding whether a 
common monetary policy is feasible.
4 Our approach complements the ‘shocks’ literature 
by applying the Enders and Hurn (1994) theory of Generalized Purchasing Power Parity 
(G-PPP), to assess the potential for an OCA amongst the ASEAN5 countries, by looking 
at the behavior of their long-run real exchange rates, both before and after the Asian 
financial crisis. Although there are multiple, and often conflicting criteria for judging the 
feasibility of a currency union, an important consideration is whether the macroeconomic 
fundamentals which drive the real exchange rates of the ASEAN5 are sufficiently 
integrated, so they share the same kind of real disturbances. In contrast to Enders and 
Hurn, who were more concerned with testing G-PPP in general, using a large bloc of 
industrialized and developing countries from the Pacific Rim, we apply the theory 
directly to the ASEAN5 countries which are, in principle, committed to further monetary 
and exchange rate integration.  
We begin in 2 with some background on monetary integration in EA. This is followed in 
3 by a review of the theory of G-PPP and its relevance to the OCA issue. Our empirical 
analysis and results are then discussed in 4 and 5, and the paper is completed with a short 
conclusion. Although the application of OCA criteria is notoriously demanding, we 
cannot find convincing evidence that ASEAN5 constitute a potential currency area with 
the USA or Japan, even when the ‘noisy’ period of the Asian financial crisis is omitted. 
 
2. Monetary integration in East Asia
5 
Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8 there existed only rudimentary monetary and 
exchange rate cooperation between EA countries (Chan and Rajan, 2001). There had 
been some discussion about the development of a yen bloc but there was little evidence 
that such a bloc had emerged. There was also a notable absence of any collective defence 
against currency crises apart from a limited network of bilateral repurchase agreements 
                                                 
3 For example, the ‘OCA index’ produced by Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1998).  
4 As in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) and Chow and Kim (2000). 
5 For more views on the progress of Asian monetary and exchange rate cooperation, see Kwack,(2004, 
2005), Stevensen (2004), Kohsaka (2004), Pomfret (2005), Nasution (2005) and Wilson (2005a, 2005b).   3
(repos), some currency swap arrangements and some informal cooperation between 
regional central banks. 
The crisis itself renewed political interest in Asian monetary and exchange rate 
cooperation, not least because it demonstrated the extent to which EA economies had 
become integrated into global goods and factor markets in the 1990s.  The counterpart of 
this increased interdependence with each other and with the rest of the world was greater 
exposure to spillover effects across national boundaries, including financial contagion. 
Insofar as these effects were externalities which could not be internalized by any one 
country individually, there were calls to supplement national policies with cooperative 
solutions at the regional level. The attractiveness of a regional solution had also been 
enhanced by the perception that international organizations, such as the IMF, had failed 
to anticipate the crisis, had wrongly diagnosed it as a ‘Latin-American’ style structural 
crisis, had been slow to disburse funds, and imposed excessive conditionality on the loans 
that were eventually given.  
Although the 1997 Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund did not materialize, 
largely due to opposition from the IMF and Washington, there have been a number of 
regional initiatives in monetary and exchange rate cooperation since the crisis. The 
Manila Framework Group was set up in November 1997 to enhance trans-Pacific 
monetary cooperation and following the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ of May 2000 and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) meeting in Honolulu the following year, the 
ASEAN+3
6 have created a regional network of bilateral repos and currency swaps. The 
sums involved are quite small and are complementary to IMF lending but constitute the 
beginnings of a regional financing facility and a symbolic first step towards monetary 
cooperation. ASEAN and ASEAN+3 are also pressing ahead with a regional bond market 
and their own IMF-style surveillance and monitoring machinery supported by a new 
Regional Economic Monitoring Unit (REMU) at the ADB.
7 
There is widespread agreement that an EA monetary union is not on the horizon in the 
absence of a sufficiently strong political commitment to develop the requisite institutional 
structure and pool of sovereignty to have any chance of success (Nicolas, 1999, Bayoumi 
                                                 
6 ASEAN plus Korea, China and Japan.    4
and Mauro, 2001, Wilson 2005b). But this does not preclude further steps towards closer 
regional monetary and exchange rate cooperation and there is more disagreement as to 
how far EA or a subset of EA countries, such as ASEAN5, satisfy the economic 
preconditions for an OCA.  
A number of criteria have been put forward to help decide whether a group of countries  
constitute an OCA. In the original Mundellian (1961) sense an OCA exists when the 
benefits of fixing exchange rates in a geographical area exceed the costs. This need not 
necessarily be defined by contiguous geographical boundaries, since it could take the 
form of a common anchor to a specific currency, and thus a common monetary policy. A 
monetary union would then be an extreme form of monetary integration where there is a 
common currency and central bank. 
Mundell (1961) himself stressed the need for sufficient factor mobility (particularly 
labour) to enable countries to adjust to asymmetric output shocks without resort to the 
exchange rate.
 8  McKinnon (1963) emphasised the importance of  openness (high 
proportion of traded to non-traded goods) so that giving up the exchange rate instrument 
would be no cost since the expenditure switching effects of depreciation would in any 
case quickly pass through to higher domestic prices and wages and offset any competitive 
advantage from the original devaluation or depreciation. Kenen (1969) pointed out that a 
high degree of product diversification would be a positive factor since OCA members 
would be more likely to have a diversified portfolio of jobs and be less susceptible to 
industry-specific shocks. 
From the exchange rate point of view, Melitz (1995) showed that the net benefits of 
giving up the nominal exchange rate if there is some wage-price stickiness, depends on a 
country’s trade weighted covariance of real exchange rates with its trading partners. A 
high covariance means that a change in the nominal rate will move the real rate in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Both REMU and ARIC can be found at http://aric.adb.org. For an update on the commitment to monetary 
integration, see ADB.org. 
8 Although Mundell worried in 1961 that countries which were dissimilar would not be able to have a 
common monetary policy in the face of asymmetric shocks, he later (Mundell, 1973) realized that this 
doesn’t make sense for highly diversified industrial countries producing a wide range of goods. 
Heterogeneous economies could share the risks from asymmetric shocks better within a common currency 
area as long as there is international portfolio diversification in capital markets, so a country which suffered 
an adverse shock could easily borrow from other countries in the currency area and so share the risks of 
asymmetric shocks. Mundell’s own views on the prospects for an Asian currency area can be found in 
Mundell (2003).   5
desired direction in terms of each partner so devaluation/depreciation is effective. But if 
the covariance is low, devaluation/depreciation may be appropriate for some partners, but 
not for all, so the exchange rate weapon becomes less effective and the costs of joining a 
monetary union are reduced. 
The problem with single OCA criteria is that they may conflict (Tavlas, 1994)
9: a country 
may be very open to trade but at the same time have a low level of labour mobility.  
Moreover, they are not strictly necessary as prerequisites for monetary integration 
providing there is sufficient endogenous convergence and political will (Frankel and 
Rose, 1998). Countries are more likely to satisfy the criteria ex post and historical 
extrapolation can be misleading. High inflation countries, for example, may be more 
willing to join a monetary union precisely because it will enable them to by-pass 
domestic political constraints and gain the credibility of the common central bank.  
Nonetheless, the consensus view is that OCAs are more likely to be feasible if member 
countries are closely linked by trade in goods and services and by factor mobility, or 
there is evidence of convergence in the levels and behaviour of key macroeconomic 
indicators relevant to a common monetary policy, such as inflation, unemployment, 
budget deficits (indicating fiscal sustainability), interest rates, and exchange rates. An 
OCA is also more likely to succeed where there is evidence of small and synchronised 
supply and demand shocks between the potential members, fast adjustment to shocks, and 
common business cycles. 
Empirical work on the feasibility of EA as an OCA is still very much in its infancy and 
has largely revolved around an ad hoc application of single OCA criteria and more formal 
modelling of the magnitude and characteristics of the supply and demand shocks 
affecting countries over time. For example, building on earlier work by Goto and 
Hamada (1994), Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1998), constructed an OCA index of 
                                                 
9 Bayoumi (1994) has neatly incorporated Mundell, McKinnon and Kenen criteria into a general 
equilibrium model of the OCA adding the key insight that the bloc’s common external exchange rate is, by 
definition, some average of what would have been the equilibrium exchange rates of the members had they 
not been in a currency union. So if some members experience asymmetric shocks, the external exchange 
rate cannot move to satisfy them all. However, the net benefits of membership increase for a given country 
facing a negative asymmetric shock with the degree of openness representing a high level of ‘cross’ or 
diversified consumption (McKinnon), the degree of international labour mobility (Mundell), and the degree 
of industrial diversification which reduces the size of aggregate shocks (Kenen). 
   6
exchange rate variability predicted by proxies for standard OCA arguments: the 
asymmetry in output disturbances, dissimilarity in the export composition of pairs of 
trading partners, the magnitude of bilateral trade, and the size of the economy (the net 
costs of giving up unilateral exchange rates may be lower for small economies). This was 
supplemented by a more formal testing procedure based on Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) which utilises a structural vector autoregression 
methodology to identify disturbances with temporary and permanent impacts on output, 
which can then be attributed to aggregate demand and supply shocks and correlated 
across countries to compare the size and speed of adjustment to disturbances. In practice, 
the emphasis has been on supply shocks on the grounds that demand disturbances largely 
reflect macroeconomic policy decisions, including exchange rate policy, and are not 
likely to be invariant to the choice of exchange rate regime. Supply shocks, on the other 
hand, are considered to be more structural in nature and less sensitive to the choice of 
exchange rate regime.
10 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) and Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1998) came to the 
surprising conclusion that 9 EA countries satisfied the standard economic criteria for an 
OCA almost as well as Western Europe. Bayoumi and Mauro (2001) also found that, 
although ASEAN was less suitable for monetary integration than Europe just prior to the 
Maastricht Treaty, the economic differences were not that large.   
Later empirical work has, however, been less supportive. This has been complicated by 
the use of changing samples of countries. Unlike in Europe, it is not at all clear what 
would constitute a reasonable ‘core’ of Asian countries suitable for closer monetary 
integration.
11 
One persistent theme is the lack of similarity in levels of economic development and 
convergence in income per capita. EA is geographically quite disparate (Indonesia is a 
vast country while Singapore and Hong Kong are small) and there are significant 
differences in basic economic indicators. Japan and Korea are now fully developed 
countries. Agriculture is dominant in Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and still important in the 
                                                 
10 For a discussion of this issue, see Chow and Kim (2000). 
11 Artis and Zhang (2002), for example, found quite distinct ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ groups in the European 
Union using fuzzy clustering techniques and Park (2002) finds clear evidence that Europe became a 
‘convergence club’ between 1960 and 2000.   7
Philippines and Indonesia, but is negligible in oil-rich Brunei and service-oriented 
Singapore and Hong Kong.  
Even if more formal statistical techniques are applied, it is not at all obvious what would 
constitute a distinct economic grouping in East Asia. Yuen (2000), for example, using 
hierarchical cluster analysis over the period 1990 to 1997 placed Japan with a group of 
mature developed countries with high income per capita, low GDP growth and moderate 
inflation (Australia, New Zealand, USA). Further clusters included a high growth Asian 
group comprising Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, characterized by moderate income per 
head, inflation and interest rates; a group of emerging economies (Indonesia, Philippines) 
with moderate growth, low income per capita and high inflation; and the small open 
economies of Hong Kong and Singapore which share the characteristics of the highest 
income per capita, the lowest interest rates, the highest value-added in services and the 
lowest value-added in agriculture. A fifth cluster consisted solely of China which was 
distinctly different from the rest of the Asian sample! 
Recent work on ‘shocks’ has also been more guarded. Chow and Kim (2000) found that 
country specific shocks dominated the determination of output in EA, in stark contrast to 
Europe where regional shocks predominated. If the shocks facing countries are largely 
country-specific, rather than regional or global, the case for an OCA is weakened since it 
is predicated on the basis of similar or highly correlated shocks among members which, 
by definition would be global or regional in origin.
12 Similarly, Zhang et al. (2004) could 
not find strong support for an OCA among 10 Asian countries, although there were some 
small subgroups with correlated and small disturbances and generally the speed of 
adjustment to shocks was higher than in the European Union. 
ASEAN5, as a subset of EA, is a more manageable sample to deal with and can be 
justified on the grounds that the countries concerned are part of a de jure trade bloc with 
established institutions. Its policymakers have expressed interest in establishing closer 
                                                 
12 Country-specific shocks might include changes in monetary or fiscal policy, in productivity, or in the 
terms of trade, while regional shocks from the EA point of view could arise from changes in the yen-dollar 
rate or China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Good examples of global shocks would be an 
oil price hike, cycles in global electronics demand or supply and the terrorist attacks in the USA in 
September 2001.   8
monetary ties, and it has a history of commitment to trade integration.
13 The problem 
with the enlarged ASEAN10 is that there is a significant disparity between the richer 
members in terms of income per capita, such as Singapore and Malaysia,
14 followed by 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and the newer members (Laos, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Vietnam) and there is little evidence that the gap in income per capita among 
ASEAN countries has been narrowing (Park, 2000).
15  
Between 1983 and 2003 ASEAN5 exports grew at an annual rate of 9.7 percent, 
outpacing that of most developed and developing economies.
16  As a result, the bloc’s 
share of global trade rose to over 5.1% in 2003. Intra-ASEAN5 trade based on the origin 
of imports and destination of exports had also increased to around 20 percent by 2003, 
but is heavily dominated by flows between Singapore and other ASEAN5 members, 
especially Malaysia. The share of bilateral trade between Singapore and Malaysia was 40 
percent of total intra-ASEAN5 trade in 2003. Moreover, much of ASEAN5 trade is with 
other countries in East Asia, such as Japan, China and Korea. Thus whilst intra-ASEAN5 
exports accounted for only 17% of total ASEAN+3 exports in 2003, ASEAN+3 exports 
to ASEAN+3 countries amounted to over 40%.  
On the positive side, there is increasing evidence of a strengthening of cross-border 
production networks in ASEAN5, particularly in electronics and automobiles, based on 
networks of complementary production by different companies leading to integration of 
production chains across the region (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2005). Certainly 






                                                 
13 Since the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement in 1992 some progress has been made in 
tariff reductions but significant institutional and non-tariff barriers remain. Nonetheless in November 2002 
ASEAN leaders agreed to work towards an ASEAN Economic Community. For some background on 
ASEAN trade integration, see Tongzon (2003). 
14 Although Brunei is one of the older members of the bloc and is relatively advanced in terms of income 
per capita, this is largely a result of its oil and gas resources. There are also data problems since it is not a 
member of the International Monetary Fund. 
15 Mcleer and Lee (2004) also found little evidence of income convergence between pairs of ASEAN5 
countries using time series tests.  
16 The data on regional trade integration is taken from the Monetary Authority of Singapore (2005).   9
3. Generalized Purchasing Power Parity and the Optimum Currency Area 
 
One way to establish whether there is a natural currency area among a group of countries 
is to see if its currencies are cointegrated since this might be broadly indicative of 
similarities in the economic forces which drive the member exchange rates or 
commonalities in exchange rate policy.  Aggarwal and Mougoue (1993), for example, 
found evidence of such currency interdependence for Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Singapore. In a later study, Tse and Ng (1997) confirmed this only if 
Korea and Taiwan were added to the sample, especially if the time period were extended 
up to 1994. But it is not clear why movements in real exchange rates (RERs) should be 
similar between countries even if nominal rates move in harmony and it is real rates 
which are more relevant to OCA fundamentals and a common monetary policy. 
If, however, each currency was de facto pegged to a common major currency, such as the 
US dollar, then real exchange rates would be constant across the currency bloc and the 
focus would be purely on inflation differentials.
17 Indeed, there is evidence that many 
countries in EA, including the ASEAN5, were implicitly dollar pegging before the crisis, 
and returned to a looser ‘dollar bloc’ in the immediate post-crisis period (McKinnon, 
2000). But dollar pegging is consistent with a substantial amount of variation in real rates 
since the extent of dollar pegging varied among ASEAN5 countries, the pegging 
coefficients are less prominent at lower data frequencies, and the extent of pegging varied 
over time. In the period immediately before the Asian crisis when dollar pegging was 
popular, the Indonesian and Thai currencies were relatively stable against the US dollar 
but experienced greater variation in their nominal and real effective exchange rates 
(Table 1). The Malaysian ringgit was also quite stable in nominal dollar terms but with 
much greater effective variation. The Singapore dollar, on the other hand, was quite 
stable in bilateral dollar terms and had the lowest variation on the basket measures. The 
Philippine peso, which was officially free floating, exhibited the highest volatility against 
the dollar and in basket terms.  
In the post-crisis period, average currency volatility was more than twice that of the pre-
crisis period (Table 1), with a substantial increase for Indonesia. To some extent this 
reflected a move towards greater exchange rate flexibility, with the notable exception of   10
Malaysia which joined the hard dollar peggers in September 1998. Thailand (2000), 
Indonesia (2000) and the Philippines (2002) all adopted de jure inflation targeting 
regimes over this period and Singapore was prepared to widen its target exchange rate 
policy band when necessary to adjust to external shocks. Some amount of dollar pegging 
and exchange rate targeting is thus compatible with the move towards greater exchange 
rate flexibility in the EA region and Ho and McCauley (2003) conclude that emerging 
market economies have responded more to exchange rate changes than would be required 
for inflation targeting but they have not been pre-occupied with exchange rate 
stabilization to the extent that inflation targeting has been compromised.  
G-PPP theory (Enders and Hurn, 1994) was developed ‘to explain the stylized facts of 
real exchange rate behavior’ consistent with standard open economy models, in response 
to the empirical evidence that purchasing power parity theory (PPP), both in its absolute 
and relative forms, was inadequate to explain price and exchange rate movements for low 
inflation countries after the Second World War. This is not surprising if the fundamental 
variables which lie behind real exchange rates do not converge to a stable long-run mean 
or share any common trends. 
The empirical failure of PPP is also consistent with many structural models of exchange 
rate behavior, such as the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model. In this model nominal 
shocks can induce short-run deviations from PPP even if long-run money neutrality 
guarantees that these shocks have no long-run effects on real variables. On the other 
hand, real shocks, such as output shocks, can affect real variables and permanent real 
shocks can produce permanent changes in the RER. PPP fails, therefore, because the 
fundamental macroeconomic variables which determine RERs, such as real output levels 
or expenditure patterns, are themselves nonstationary variables, so the RERs are also 
nonstationary. 
The importance of fundamentals in determining equilibrium RERs is now well 
established in the literature. See, for example, Edwards (1994), MacDonald (1998), Clark 
and MacDonald (1999) and the review by Driver and Westaway (2001). G-PPP, which is 
consistent with models of RER behavior which incorporate ‘fundamental’ variables, 
provides a useful vehicle to examine the case for an OCA in the original Mundellian 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the significance of this point.   11
(1961) meaning that within an OCA, real output levels and possibly expenditure patterns 
will share common trends. Note that this is only one (necessary but not sufficient) 
criterion for the formation of an OCA. In the two-country case, to see if they constitute an 
OCA is tantamount to testing if PPP holds between them, which will be true if their 
bilateral RER measured in terms of one of the countries is stationary. However, even if 
individual RER series are nonstationary, as the empirical evidence suggests, certain 
groupings of them in a multicountry setting may be stationary if their real fundamentals 
are sufficiently interrelated such that they share a reduced number of common trends. 
One can then use cointegration analysis to establish whether this is true. 
Following Enders and Hurn (1994), suppose that m+1 of the countries in an n-country 
world constitute the domain of a currency area, then there exists a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between their m bilateral real rates such that: 
 
r12t = β13 r13t + β14r14t + … + β1mr1mt + et       ( 1 )  
 
where the r1it are the logarithmic real exchange rates in period t between country 1 (base 
country) and country i. The β1i are the parameters of the cointegrating vector and et is a 
stationary stochastic disturbance term. If a vector of bilateral real rates share common 
trends, there will exist at least one linear combination of the real rates which is stationary. 
Thus the RERs will be cointegrated, which is a reflection of sufficient interrelationship 
among their underlying economies, G-PPP will hold and the set of countries can be 
construed as satisfying one of the necessary conditions for forming a potential OCA. 
Enders and Hurn (1994) further show that G-PPP depends on the interrelationships 
between the underlying fundamentals and how the values of the β coefficients in equation 
(1) are related to the various behavioral parameters of the aggregate demand functions 
derived from a market-clearing model.  So the coefficients in the cointegrating vector of 
bilateral RERs are not arbitrary but are functions of the parameters in a goods market-
clearing relationship. If the RERs are nonstationary then there must be at least one of the 
income processes which is nonstationary, which is likely, since the macroeconomic 
variables are themselves likely to be nonstationary. The real income processes are linked 
through technology transfers, immigration, capital movements etc.   12
Enders and Hurn were more concerned with overcoming the limitations of PPP theory 
than identifying blocs of countries suitable for monetary integration based on the 
behavior of their long-run real exchange rates, but a positive finding for G-PPP does 
imply the latter. More specifically, they found that G-PPP did not hold for the 
industrialized countries (Germany, Japan, UK, USA) but did hold for a sample of Pacific 
Rim countries (except India)
18 together with the industrialized countries. However, only 
Australia, Korea and the Philippines formed a coherent group based on bilateral RERs 
and they were more heavily influenced by the exchange rates of the industrialized 
countries so there was little evidence of any subgroup of Pacific Rim countries which 
constituted a currency area.  
Other work testing G-PPP has been scant. Mkenda (2001) found mixed results for the 
East African Community (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) using a variety of OCA criteria but 
found cointegration between their RERs (using Kenya as the base currency) over the 
period 1981-98 and over one of the sub-periods (1990-98). Grandes (2003) comes to 
similar conclusions for the Common Monetary Area (CMA) in Southern Africa or ‘rand 
zone’ over the period 1990 to 2001.
19  
For East Asia specifically, Ogawa and Kawasaki (2003) carried out an exhaustive battery 
of 398 Johansen cointegration tests for all combinations of 3 to 7 East Asian countries 
before the Asian financial crisis. When the US dollar is used as the base currency only 
one grouping passed their robustness tests: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, 
but when a common currency basket consisting of the US dollar, the yen and the German 
mark (equally weighted) is used as the numeraire, they find 12 potential OCA 
combinations, including groups of three ASEAN countries and some combinations of 
three ASEAN countries with either the Korean won or the Chinese yuan. Choudhry 
(2005) also tested G-PPP for five East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, South Korea) both before and after the crisis using the US dollar, yen, and Thai 
Baht as base currencies. He found no support for an OCA pre-crisis but significant 
cointegration for all base currencies post-crisis and suggested that this might be explained 
by a higher level of policy coordination and linkages between exchange rate policies. 
                                                 
18 Australia, Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore.   13
The objective of this paper is to apply G-PPP directly to assess the potential for a 
currency union between the ASEAN5 countries, which are committed in principle to 
further monetary integration. Our approach complements the ‘shocks’ literature by 
looking at the behavior of  long-run RERs to establish whether the differences in 
macroeconomic fundamentals which drive the RERs of the ASEAN5 are sufficiently 
integrated, so they share the same kind of real disturbances. If they do not share the same 
kind of real disturbances, or the speed of adjustment to these disturbances is very 
different or very slow, then from the G-PPP perspective, at least, they do not constitute an 
OCA. 
 
4. Testing G-PPP in East Asia 
 
Sample and data 
 
   Using the US dollar as the base currency or numeraire, monthly data was collected 
between 1975(1) and 2004(2) for each country’s nominal exchange rate against the US 
dollar, and price level, represented by the consumer price index (cpi), from the 
International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics CD-Rom database. All 
nominal exchange rates against the US dollar and price indices were normalized, with 
January 1975 as the initial observation set to zero, and dollar-based RERs computed 
according to the following formula: 
 
qt = st + p t
 * – pt              ( 2 )  
 
where qt is the real exchange rate, st is the domestic currency price of the base currency 
(US dollar), p* is the base country (US) price level, and pt is the domestic price level. All 
variables are in natural logarithms and are normalized on 1975(1) = 0.  
 
Unit Root Testing 
For G-PPP to hold, all RERs must be individually nonstationary and there should be 
evidence of cointegration among the set of RERs of the countries constituting the 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 The CMA was formed in 1974 and by 1990 consisted of Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, with 
Botswana as a de facto member.   14
potential OCA. Initial pre-testing involved inspection of the sample autocorrelation 
functions (ACFs) to check for the level of integration of the series and plots of all the 
RER variables to check for structural breaks, the presence or otherwise of drift and/or a 
deterministic time trend. 
Figure 1 plots the ASEAN country RERs (in levels and first differences) over the whole 
sample period. The visual evidence and ACFs suggest the RERs are nonstationary in 
levels but stationary in first differences, with no obvious tendency to mean reversion. But 
there is a clear-cut structural break during the Asian financial crisis, roughly between 
1997(6) and 1998(2) which would have the effect of biasing the unit root tests towards 
non-rejection. Consequently, we decided to omit the ‘noisy’ period of the crisis and test 
G-PPP both pre-crisis from 1975(1) to 1997(5) and post crisis from 1998(2) to 2004(2). 
Since the visual evidence in Figure 1 suggests that trends are present in both periods, unit 
root tests are carried out with trends included, though similar results were obtained when 
only constant terms are included. Two tests were performed. The first  
is an asymptotically more powerful variant of the Dickey-Fuller test developed by Elliot 
et al. (1996), which they called the DF-GLS test on account of the generalized least 
squares detrending procedure that is involved. Since the improvement in the power of the 
test comes mostly from the detrending procedure, the gain from using the DF-GLS test is 
potentially large when a trend is present, as in our RERs. Critical values are computed 
from the response surface analysis of Cheung and Lai (1995). Since standard information 
criteria, such as the AIC, tend to underestimate the cost of a low order model when the 
unit root process has a negative moving average root and, hence, tend to select a lag 
length that is too small, we use the modified AIC (MAIC) of Ng and Perron (2001) for 
lag selection. This offers substantial size improvements over the usual information 
criteria when applied to DF-GLS tests. 
The second unit root test we carried out is the well-known semi-parametric procedure of 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), popularly known as the KPSS test after the initials of its 
originators. This test reverses the ‘burden of proof’ by testing the null hypothesis of 
stationarity against the alternative of a unit root in order to overcome the low power of 
Dickey-Fuller tests and reduce the ambiguity surrounding  the unit root properties of 
RERs. Within the classical testing framework, the KPSS test is intended to complement   15
the DF-GLS test. The lag order for this test is derived from an automatic data-based 
bandwidth selection routine and the estimates of the long-run variances of RERs are 
obtained from the quadratic spectral kernel, as described in Andrews (1991). 
The unit root test results in Table 2 confirm the I(1) nature of the RER series with the 
sole exception of the KPSS test for Malaysia in the post-crisis period, but even in this 





The econometric strategy is to estimate the system initially as an unrestricted reduced 
form multivariate model with the relevant RERs included as endogenous stochastic 
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where yt, zt are respectively n×1 and q×1 vectors of observations at time t on the 
endogenous and non-modelled variables, the {πi} are unrestricted parameters and m and r 
are the orders of the lags used. Since all y variables have the same lag length and there 
are no non-modelled variables in the system (z) except for a deterministic constant, (6) 
can be reparameterized as a vector error-correction model (VECM). The VECM is 
estimated via multivariate least squares for the pre and post-crisis periods with all 
variables entered in logs, and was followed by a formal cointegration analysis using the 
maximum likelihood method proposed by Johansen (1988).  
Since parsimony was not crucial at this stage we selected the optimal VECM lag length 
using the AIC criterion subject to a maximum of 12 lags. We also ensured that data 
congruency was maintained as indicated by vector test analogues of those used for single 
equation diagnostics. As is not uncommon, the vector normality test widely rejects but 
                                                 
20 Although we have taken some care to confirm the nonstationarity of the RER series, since this is 
fundamental to the G-PPP theory, there remains the possibility that the series may be nonstationary locally 
but globally mean reverting. A number of recent studies, such as Sarno (2000) and Taylor and Peel (2000), 
have suggested that the behaviour of the exchange rate for industrial countries is indeed nonlinear in nature,   16
was not taken as a binding constraint in the lag selection process. As a final check, we re-
ran the unit root tests and cointegration analysis using the yen as the numeraire currency 
in place of the US dollar. Again some of the pairwise trace tests were significant, but we 
could find no robust evidence that ASEAN5 constitutes an OCA with Japan. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Although the Enders and Hurn model provides some guidance on the interpretation of the 
cointegration results, it is difficult to establish a benchmark for interpreting the 
coefficients, especially when the results are sensitive to the econometric strategy, 
including the appropriate choice of lag length in the VECM and the presence of 
significant multiple cointegration vectors.
21 In particular, it is not clear a priori whether 
the sign on the beta coefficients in the normalized cointegration vector should be positive 
or negative. Cointegration is supportive of an OCA insofar as the macroeconomic 
fundamentals which drive the RERs of the countries concerned are sufficiently integrated 
so they share the same kind of real disturbances, but a negative sign suggests an 
asymmetry in the way the countries adjust to shocks. The implication is that the 
currencies concerned might still co-move in the short term, as one would expect if they 
are competitors, but not in long-run equilibrium. This would make a common monetary 
policy more difficult.   
The trace test results for cointegration between pairs of ASEAN5 RERs are presented in 
Table 3. The null hypothesis is that the number of cointegrating vectors is zero against 
the alternative that it is greater than zero. Of course, the presence or absence of 
cointegration for a pair of countries does not necessarily imply anything about the 
cointegrating relationships for groups of countries measured against a base currency. To 
see whether ASEAN5 as a group constitutes an OCA, the Johansen multivariate 
cointegration results are listed in Table 4, together with a further test of restrictions in the 
form of a likelihood ratio (LR) test under the null hypothesis that a specific beta 
                                                                                                                                                 
further reducing the power of the standard ADF test. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing 
this out. For the Asian context, see Chortareas et. al (2002) and Liew et al. (2004). 
21 It appears to be quite easy to find significant cointegration when testing G-PPP but difficult to select 
meaningful  cases on the basis of standard robustness tests (Ogawa and Kawasaki, 2003).   17
coefficient is zero and the associated country could be excluded from the cointegrating 
vector. The LR test is distributed as a  χ1
2 variate. 
In the pre-crisis period there are only three significant pairs from the bilateral trace tests  
(Table 3): Indonesia-Malaysia, Singapore-Malaysia and Thailand-Philippines, and the 
positive sign holds only in the Singapore-Malaysia case. Furthermore, there is no 
evidence of cointegration for ASEAN5 at the 5% probability level, only Malaysia and 
Singapore reject in terms of the LR test of restrictions, and the alpha coefficients, which 
represent the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium are extremely small and in 
some cases not significantly different from zero (Table 4a).
22  
Post-crisis, six out of ten pairs are now significantly cointegrated but only Indonesia-
Malaysia has a positive sign. At the group level there is cointegration for ASEAN5 
(Table 4b) and no individual country can be excluded on the basis of LR tests, but there 
are multiple cointegration vectors which makes interpretation of the coefficients difficult. 
When a Johansen normalization restriction is imposed on the first vector and the beta 
coefficients are interpreted as long-run ‘elasticities’ between the RERs, there are some 
asymmetries in exchange rate adjustment: a one percent rise in the Indonesian RER (real 
depreciation) induces an 8 percent depreciation of the real value of the ringgit and a 6 
percent depreciation in the real value of the Singapore dollar, but a 4 percent 
appreciation in the real Thai baht and a 0.6% appreciation in the Philippine peso. 
Moreover, some of the beta coefficients look rather large, signaling dissimilarity in 
aggregate demand parameters between pairs of countries, as suggested in the Enders and 
Hurn (1994) model (see Section 3 above).  
As far as the speed of adjustment is concerned, only the coefficient for Thailand is 
significant at conventional levels. For Indonesia and Thailand, adjustment appears to be 
quick, while for the Philippines the error-correction process is very slow.  
A more clear-cut group result post-crisis is for Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
(ASEAN3) where there is a significant single cointegrating vector and all tests of 
restrictions reject at low significance levels (Table 4c). In this case a one percent 
Malaysian real depreciation induces a 0.4 percent depreciation of the real Thai baht but a 
                                                 
22 This implies that the relevant exchange rate is weakly exogenous i.e. the cointegration relationship does 
not enter into the equation.   18
0.8 percent appreciation of the real Singapore dollar. The negative sign for Singapore 
again suggests an asymmetry in exchange rate adjustment but is consistent with the long-
term historical tendency for the Singapore dollar to appreciate in real terms against the 
US dollar while the opposite is more likely for the ringgit and Thai baht.
23 A possible 
interpretation of this is that ASEAN3 as a group share some common trends in their 
RERs but that this is offset by asymmetries in their exchange rate policies. 
As far as a comparison with previous studies is concerned, it is difficult to make a direct 
comparison. Ogawa and Kawasaki (2003) looked at East Asia but only pre-Asian crisis 
and provide no details on the cointegration coefficients. When the US dollar is used as 
the base currency (as in our case), out of a large number of group combinations, there is 
only one significant result (multiple cointegration vectors) which passes their robustness 
criteria, namely an ASEAN4 bloc comprising Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia.  Much more supportive are the cointegration results using a currency basket 
containing the US dollar, the yen and the German mark. Although ASEAN5 as a group is 
not significant, there are 12 other significant combinations of two or three ASEAN 
countries, both with and without one other East Asian currency (Chinese yuan or Korean 
won). 
As in our case, Choudhry (2005) was unable to find cointegration between a sample of 
East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea) pre-crisis 
using the US dollar, yen, and Thai baht as base currencies, but surprisingly excludes 
Singapore and did not test for ASEAN5. Post-crisis there is a single cointegration vector 
for all base currencies, and this is taken as evidence in favour of an OCA, but the 
asymmetry in the signs of the beta coefficients is not discussed.  
 
Conclusion 
   The objective of this paper has been to apply the theory of Generalized Purchasing 
Power Parity, which looks at the behavior of long-run real exchange rates, to re-assess the 
potential for an OCA among a subset of East Asian countries based on five members of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Our findings suggest little support for an 
OCA for ASEAN5 as a bloc prior to the Asian financial crisis and mixed results in the 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Peebles and Wilson (2002).   19
post-crisis period. In particular, asymmetries in the way countries adjust to shocks and 
low or insignificant speeds of adjustment were found. Thus, although the application of 
single OCA criteria is notoriously demanding and our tests apply to only one of the many 
criteria for the successful formation of an OCA, we cannot find persuasive evidence that 
ASEAN5 as a group constitute a potential currency area with either the USA or Japan, 
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Table 1: ASEAN5 exchange rate volatility July 1994 to March 2003 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Standard deviation of monthly changes:     




Indonesia   0.26      1.37  1.47        
Malaysia   0.90      1.26  1.45   
Philippines   1.21      1.84  1.97 
Singapore   0.73      0.67  0.74     
Thailand   0.41      0.97  1.13 




Indonesia   3.61      4.28  5.63 
Malaysia   2.08      2.22  2.41    
Philippines   1.90      2.19    2.55   
Singapore   1.35          1.02      1.05 
Thailand   2.27      2.52  2.75 
Average   2.24      2.45  2.88 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: The standard deviations are calculated from changes in the exchange rate indexes with March 
1995=100; pre-crisis covers the period from July 1994 to June 1996 and post crisis is from February 1998 
to March 2003. 
 
Sources: Calculated from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; Asian 
Development Bank, Asia Recovery Information Centre. 
 




Table 2: Unit root tests for the real exchange rate variables (base currency=US$)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-crisis 1975(1) to 1997(5) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Country  Test  statistic   Lag   Test  Statistic   Lag 
  DF-GLS     KPSS 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Indonesia  -1.678   2    0.814**   4 
Malaysia  -1.220   1    0.741**   4    
Philippines  -1.326   9    0.774**   4 
Singapore  -0.556   1    1.140**   4 
Thailand  -1.284   1    0.876**   4 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Post-crisis 1998(2) to 2004(2) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Country  Test  statistic   Lag   Test  Statistic   Lag 
  DF-GLS     KPSS 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Indonesia  -1.837    2   0.158*    3 
Malaysia  -2.547    3   0.074    3 
Philippines  -1.893    1   0.156*    3 
Singapore  -1.158    2   0.307**   3 
Thailand  -2.019    1   0.257**   3 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
All the variables are monthly in logs. A * indicates significance at the 5 percent 
probability level, ** at 1 percent. DF-GLS is the generalized Dickey-Fuller test from 
Elliot et al. (1996) with critical values from Cheung and Lai (1995). The optimal lag for 
this test is based on the modified Akaike Information Criterion (MAIC) of Ng and Perron 
(2001). KPSS is the semi-parametric procedure from Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) with the 
lag order derived from the automatic data-based bandwidth selection routine and 
estimates of long-run variances described in Andrews (1991).    26





Values of λtrace   for H0: rank = 0     
________________________________________________________________________ 
  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore    
Indonesia          
Malaysia  23.882(2)**     
Philippines  3.866(10)  12.484(2)       
Singapore  11.064(3)  16.826(2)*  12.811(2)            






Values of λtrace   for H0: rank = 0     
________________________________________________________________________ 
  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore    
Indonesia          
Malaysia  15.254(12)     
Philippines  25.604(10)**  36.766(12)**       
Singapore  36.985(10)**  50.924(12)**  34.209(12)**            
Thailand 13.479(12)  7.501(11)  2.647(9) 30.873(10)**     
   
________________________________________________________________________ 
λtrace  is the trace test statistic for the number of cointegrating vectors under the null 
hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is zero against the alternative that it is 
greater than zero. A * indicates significance at the 5 percent probability level and ** at 
the 1 percent level. Figures in parentheses are the optimal lag length selected by AIC.   27












0   68.439  68.52  76.07  2  267 
1 0.1169  35.233  47.21  54.46    
2 0.0555  19.980  29.68  35.65    
3 0.0382    9.587  15.41  20.04    
4 0.0196    4.302  3.76  6.65    
5  0.0159         
           
Normalized 
coefficients 
Beta  Std error  Prob  Alpha  Std error  Prob 
Indonesia    1    -0.0002  0.0054  0.974 
Malaysia  -5.5072  0.7707  0.000    0.0088  0.0022  0.000 
Philippines   0.9691  0.8131  0.233  -0.0033  0.0042  0.431 
Singapore  -2.5768  0.8552  0.003    0.0114  0.0021  0.000 
Thailand   3.3665  1.4367  0.019    0.0004  0.0024  0.857 
Constant    1.5016         




2  Prob        
Indonesia 3.160  0.076         
Malaysia 15.19**  0.000         
Philippines 0.906  0.341         
Singapore 5.018*  0.025         
Thailand 2.787  0.095        
             28












0   342.424**  68.52  76.07  12  73 
1 0.9169  160.789**  47.21  54.46    
2 0.6759  78.519**  29.68  35.65    
3 0.5649  17.770*  15.41  20.04    
4 0.2111  0.454  3.76  6.65    
5  0.0062         
          
Normalized 
coefficients 
Beta  Std error  Prob  Alpha  Std error  Prob 
Indonesia 1        1.0222  1.0909  0.349 
Malaysia   8.2255  0.2804  0.000  -0.1230  0.0949  0.195 
Philippines -0.5934  0.0632  0.000    0.0617  0.4231  0.884 
Singapore   5.9303  0.0699  0.000   0.3736  0.2981  0.210 
Thailand -4.4499  0.0555  0.000    0.8262  0.4055  0.042 
Constant  -7.6074         




2  Prob        
Indonesia  97.463**  0.000       
Malaysia  97.558**  0.000       
Philippines  64.307**  0.000       
Singapore  95.140**  0.000       
Thailand  93.677**  0.000       
            29












0   79.156**  29.68  35.65  12  73 
1  0.5834 15.230 15.41  20.04     
2 0.1430  3.962  3.76  6.65    
3  0.0528         
          
Normalized 
coefficients 
Beta  Std error  Prob  Alpha  Std error  Prob 
Malaysia   1      -0.3373  0.0499  0.000 
Singapore   -0.7845  0.1389  0.000    0.1066  0.1111  0.337 
Thailand    0.3742  0.0880  0.000   -0.2650  0.1783  0.137 
Constant  -0.7419         




2  Prob        
Malaysia  16.975**  0.000       
Singapore  35.640**  0.000       
Thailand  18.112**  0.000       
          
Note: all variables are monthly in logs. The normalized coefficients are obtained after a 
Johansen normalization restriction is imposed. The test of restrictions is a likelihood ratio 
test of the null that the specified beta coefficient is zero. A * indicates significance at the 
5 percent probability level and ** at 1 percent. 
 
 






Figure 1: ASEAN5 real exchange rates in levels and first differences (base currency=US dollar)
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